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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF \ITAH

STATE OF l!TAH,

in the interest of:

BABY GIRL :-!ARIE,

CASE NO.

Ei~hteen

A Person Unrler

252370

Yearo of Age

BRIEF UF ,\PPELIANT

S I.\ TE:IEXT Uf ntE NATURE OF THE CASE
filis is an appeal by Lhe natural mother from an Order and

t''"

JucLT'·.'nt ,,;-

lc:privinc· ':cr

<)I

Juvenile Court entered on January 9, 1975, permanently
all parental rL;ilts in connection ·cit'· her child, baby

cirl :-•aric:; anJ irun a ,le>ciciic·n of th.c Juvenile Court on May 4, 1976,
reiu.in.' t0 vacate and set aside as null and void its order entered on

l'j75.

January (J,

l!lSPc>SITION IN LO.<ER COURT

:he Juvc:nilc Court, upon petition of the Utah Division of
l'.lc,ily Service'-,

found that the natural mother was unable to provide

:J<'cq•JatL'h· f,,r all tile need· of -;aiel child and agreed that it was in
the hl·--;t 1ntcre:st ,-.f saiJ child
~1n(•

t~H-

-.J.ill

a~

'--'lil!

t·1

~l('

for parental rights to be terminated

placeJ f,lr aJl>ption.

'JL'l,\ at 1-:hic\1 tllL'

l'~n

April 22, 1976, a

Tuvenile cl~urt refused to vacate and set

iU::LILt' Sc1UC11T UN APPEAL
~

t_,1

have Lhc ,1rdc.r of the Juvenile Court,
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terminating the appellant's parental rights, set aside as null and void
because it was entered beyond the dispositional po1oer of the Juvenile
Court under the particular circumstances of this case.

Also, the appel-

lant seeks reversal of the decision of the Juvenile Court, entered on
May 4, 1976, refusing to vacate and set aside the Court's order of
January 9, 1975.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Nadine Munoz, on August 10, 1974, gave birth to a
baby girl named Marie, 1ohen the appellant 10as sixteen (16) years of a!'"·
The natural mother's parents refused to permit her to bring the child
home, so a temporary custody authori:<.ation ,,,as given by the appellant
to the State of Utah, Division of Family Services (hereafter DFS
the day the child was born.

I

on

Appellant at no time 1vanted to give the

baby up for adoption, but ,,·as receiving extreme pressure from her parents to du so and ad,;icc '

the

•:S Social I·Jorker that 'h" should

·ivc

up her child tur acioptic,·An initlal

r,<cGCln~

-!as

lteld on August 15, 1'!74, at ,_,hich tltc'

baby girl was placed in the temporary custody of IJFS becauc>e the juvc:nile-mother had not been permitted by her parents to bring the child i,,,me
with her from the hospital.

Another hearing was scheduled for ,\ugu'

t

22, 1974.
At the August 22, hearing the juvenile mother l-Ias aclvi,.cd IJ\
the Juvenile Court referee of her right to counsel.

She Jc,irl!d t<~

speak with counsel, so the matter 1-1as continued to lktuhcr
The child was continued in the temporary custody , f Ill'S.

l, 1'1/",.
l'ltc· "' (,,),,'

arraignment
~Vas rescheduled for October 24, l'J7!+, at 1-ilti, l1 lin"· '" "'''
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for the appellant appeared before the court and entered a denial to a
petition 1-:hicil had bcc:n filed by DFS alleging that the appellant did
not want to, nor had she the capability to care for her child.

At the

October 24, arraignment, custody of the child was continued with DFS;
the natural mother 1o1as granted t·..:ice-;:eekly visitation rights with her
child ;:hich she exercised: and trial was set for November 6, 1974.
~~vember

On
counsel.

6,

the appellant appeared before the court, with

The court \·:as advised that the appellant wanted to keep her

child but that 'oer
their home.

~arents

•..:ould not allo" her to bring the child into

Thereafter, the rourt ordered that the child be placed

temp.>raril\· ·..:ith :JFS, and •:et revie1: in one vear.
the

juvenile-~other

was only sixteen (161 years

This was done because

~:

tine, tmable to indcpcndentl,· support the child.

a:e anrl, at that
No evidence was intro-

duced t•' tile court that this probler:1 l·:ould not rectify itself over tine.
flt.:.<cn~lcr

on

2,

lq7~,

~rs

filed yet another !1CV

pct:.ti~..'n

rcqucc;tin-· pL!l:"":"'anent tct:'"'inati\'n l'f the appcllant 1 s ?arer1tal rights •
"~.. 1 1L··Julccl

·.:a-

.-\ hcJrin
prtl\._L'L:llin:

:--.cnt

·.:1·,

puhliLati\1!1

:a~

:-\,r J.J.n'rary g' 1g75.
~..tllm~c·l

l.:t1

entercJ

f('r the

~-,,r ,,nL

~;o notice of

juvenile-mother.

j..._-..)ln L)oc,

this new

Summons by

the unkn,'\·.'11 father of baby

1rl '1ariL.
jilL

j.J.nuar-~;

't!Jcr .J.ppLJ.rL~
L ,)1111

l

1

11L

1

.L

L

1,

Il•lr

l,J\'111.

in

\!

1'~-:5,

rL, P'';l~L

did her 11arLIIl'
pr-..__\.l•lll'-l':

t,l

i1c.:1ring •-:a:- helJ,
.:1

--wmnons.

..1ppcar

~-etu t·,i

l,l

at h'hich the juvenile-

She. \;as nDt represented by

h'ith her beiore the court,

l1a\·c

par-

.1nythin:~ to Jo \Vith the matter.

ari lYn [lalc,

" 1

the

tile \lfS Sc'Ci<'l l<orker
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ever since the child was born.

At this hearing the juvenile-mother

agreed to the termination of her parental rights because her parents
refused to permit her to bring the child into their home, which, ,,f
course, was where the appellant also lived at the time and indeed still
lives.
For the next year the appellant made repeateu visits to the
Ogden DFS office, seeking knowledge about her chilo.

No one 1wulu tell

her anything -- not even that the child '"as adopteu in August

'~'f

Finally, the social worker told the appellant she shoulu consult
attorney, which she did immediately in Harch of 1976.

1975.
:~n

The result 1.Jac

the petition to the court, heard on April 22, l97b, requestin,; that the
court, pursuant to Section 55-10-106, u.c.A. 1953, as amended, set :hick
and vacate its order entered on January 9, 1975, penr,anently t"rminatin
the appellant's parent-child relationship.
This appeal is taken from the decision of the court, t·ntc·r,,J
after the April 22, 1::·76,

1

.ca.;cin_, dcnying the petition tcJ vacate an·l

set aside the January

ARGUHENT
POINT l
TERMINATION ACTIONS BEING EQUITY PROCEEIJlNCS tJI TilL IIIC:IILS I
DEGREE, THE SUPREHE COURT HAY RE\'lr:l-1 l'IIJ: lcVIlli:JICI: ,\!rll 'L\I:L
INDEPENDENT FINDINGS OF FACT.
This appeal has been brought hc.ocause it i '· fc:lt L11al Ll"

I:~

enile Court exceeded its authority by makii1h a dic_;])(J'-,i t~i(lll l 1 'nllirl.Ll1'1

the parental rights of the juvenile-mother l·litiJ()ttl c:tric Lly , "" .1,~,,,
and following the substantive and procC>dural rc''J"i n~'''"''"~

"I

Li"
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termination statute.

Section 55-10-109, u.c.A. 1953, as amended.

appeal, being an equity proceeding of the highest degree,
of lJ

This

In re Adoption

122 Utah 525, 252 P.2d 223, at 226 (Utah 1953), the Court may

review the evidence and make an independent determination of what the
facts are.

\,'alton v. Coffman, llO Utah 1, 169 P.2d 97, at 103 (Utah

1946!, and In reState of Utah, in the interest of Ronald Jennings and
Donald Jennings, 20 Ut.2d 50, 432 P.2d 879 (Utah 1967).
It is submitted that the Juvenile Court, which is given a
Jisp<>sition:ll <''"··:cr t,, terminate parental rights under Section 55-10-lJO
( lt1 1, .._an ,,nly
ti,>n

)~-1(1-l''''

L:·:~.;rL 1::.c

that po•.,.,rer "provided that the provisions of SecS~ction

arc u>Dplic·d ·.:ith."

55-10-100(16).
c1

ti,)nal p,;•,;cr ,,i the Juvenile Court.
111ll L'X.:lr inatiun ,11
t)l

r-v,_.ard :-,,r

L'1c

ca.~c",

'>·.':1

n··r

'.·:itl1 d.1c
ltat:tJt-,tl

rc_·ar,l

1i

-~l

tan,:.JrJ

,,1

t)n

Jan11ary ':J,

LJrL'

ltll-

t!IL'

r1:ht::.

L,!-

rL·latl,~Jt--lli:l

the

JilL Jc:,l,;;ll.l. l<•LWl

~1.<.·

1~.}--::,

.

<-

that th~.

1aade withuut

JiJt.:

and JiligL'nLt..: required in such

'.\c.\LL .\

,,, ·.,, 1,

iL\:>

)U\'cnile-mL'~ther in seeing the

~._,•ntintlc--l.

i\•1:.~;

,q~

It is further subnitted that upon

1L c:adc ·"itll due rc ..;arJ f~.1r statutolJ' requirements; nor

:1,lrLJ1L-~._llll,!

:lllli]l \

ccreJ in derogation

tlze t-act:-. and evidence of tl1i:-. .._a . . . c.

Lllc Ju\"cni l1_: l'·· 1rt, entered

And, in

1I

JilL llJ!ERE?.~l

Pl~,'EIZ Ill, Af ANY IDlE,

l'IZL\'lclUSLY l:?."l'l:IZE!l ERRclNEllUS LlRflER,

PUR-

lc•:: ',-] •-1''", U.l· •. \. l<l5J, AS ."u'IENDED.

]''
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1953, as amended, requesting the Juvenile Court to vacate tho tormination order due to substantive and procedural mistakes in tho January 'J,
1975 hearing.

Section 55-10-106 provides:
The Court may modify or set aside any order or Jecrec
made by it; but no modification of an nrucr placin~ a
child on probation shall be made upon an alleged violation of the terms of probation, <mtil there has been
a hearing after due notice to all persons concerned.
Notice and a hearing shall also be re'luircrl in anv
other case in which the effect of modifying or sc::tin~
aside an order may be to deprive a par<ent <1[ the lc,·al
custody of the child, or to make other chant:e in lc·~al
custody.

In Utah it has been held that a Juvenile Court has the pc·n.•er to rc,,pcn
a case and modify its order at any time after entrY.
45 Ut. 556, 147 P. 911 (Utah 1915).

St.,ker v. Cm:an

This deci sian l·:as .crdunJcd upun

Chapter 54, Laws of Utah 1913, which provided that·
All orders, judgments, and decreces sc1 made anJ entered
by the court shall be under its centro l, and mC!y he
modified, amended, or recalled at any time 11ntil th"
child reaches the age of twenty-one years.
The substance of this l'r2·:> coG "·
this state ever since
55-10-31, u.c.A. 1953) and constltutes thee statllt•>r': l<Jl'<cr<mnc·r ell
present Section 55-10-106.

Lll,

Also, morce rcc"ntly in tiJC ca'c· ,,J .lac,,!,

Public Welfare Commission, 7 Ut.2d '304,

32J P • ..'<l 7..'11,

aL

7'.!.

(IlLah

I'.:·,(

the Court stated:
That the Juvenile Cudct maJ· rnorlj Jy 1 t'-, ,,r,1, ,. . 1·. t··
custody or other disposition <Jf c\li_ldl ~n pn1pcrl:,·
under its jurisdictj_un hcc_att:-oc ()1 (L. . ~lilH]tlL'lH.. ~/,
neglect, or dependency, l·lhere parcntc. p1·rmanenll:·
have been dispossessed of tltL.:ir rji·.liL' 111 .t~tll
children seems unJebatabl~.
It is submitted that not only doc:~ the: .Juvcni l,· t.clllft 113'.'<

the by
inherent
power
under
itsfor governing
statutv
L{l of(.:llrrcct
pn·vintt·
Sponsored
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding
digitization provided
by the Institute
Museum and Library
ServicesL·
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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committed errors but that the Juvenile Court may do so under Section
55-l,J-l(J(J 3t ~ time, even though the normal time

in which an appeal

\·:ould othencioc bt allowed has lapsed.

PIJU,i III
Till: AP!T LL'L~f '.,·As :;, r: GUILTY 11F !.ACHES IN PETITIONING THE
JL\t:::ILE rnr_'RT Tn \'ACATE ITS PRIOR TERl'liNATinN ORDER; THE

C:''

?i:liTI,,:;

Till. JU\t:NILE COURI AND HER APPEAL fRO!-! BaTH THE

''klCI::C\L : I:K:Il::,\TIU:: URDER .-\.\'ll THE JUVENILE COURT'S REFUSAL
' T:.\C. ,JRIJER, .\RE TI:!ELY.

S,;cti.J11 :<i-1
cirLun~t.:lncc;-,

L,,urt '':ollall
tl1~.:

l1a\·e:

':a·:

, l

~

1 ','( fl

~~

G.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides that in

in '.·:hi~.._h a party ,,·as nuL represented by counsel, the
inl-L'!-r

ri~t1t

-~

J-'i(J,

t~._)

tllLr-'. at

...1ppcdl.',

tl1e

Lonclusion

~r~cecdings

,~.[

(Sec also Rule 26, UJCRPP 1974).

that they
The Juv-

7•
ll

l

·\crlil, -r·:,,tht:r, appellant ll..._~rcln.

i

11

-~·:

~:~'\·:ever,

the

th.lt the _iu\·cnill2-rc•ther ~-·as suilty of lacheo in
her child by \,·aitin~ over a year to do

...111'

1.\ir 1 n

,, ,

,! i)jl}

i

l ..._l'l

lt

l_, 1

\ ,1 L i

r

I l

IL

1 [\,_

l

~.._

\_

l

r

;

~

I

. ._ 11

\_I

I

L L lll·<l

l

hat laL-!lc~

l·annl)t

1.1e

imputcJ to one who

; de l

ilL

1

l l II

I cl,

\ •

I I• lL' 1 , ) \,l\.

111-, Lit.

)/,.,

14"' P.2d 328, at SJl (Utah
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Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256, (Utah 1975), at 1260 citing Archambault v. Sprouse, 215 S.C. 336, 55 S.E.2d 70, 12 A.L.R.2d 399 (1949l.
Indeed it has been held that an unreasonable length of time in asserting
one's legal rights or duties to which laches might otherwise apply, does
not start to run until knowledge of one's legal rights or duties is
shown to exist.

Stephan et al v. Equitable Savings and Loan Association,

522 P.2d 478, at 490 (Sup. Ct. Oreg. 1974).
tion, this was not the case.

In this particular situa-

The court specifically stated that the

appellant was not made aware of her right to appeal, and one can hanllv
expect an inexperienced sixteen (16) year old juvenile-mother, in th<e
aftermath of such a traumatic experience to be aware of or even suspect
the various technical points of the laH.
Boruff v. United States, 310 F .2d 918 (5th Cir. 1962), a c rir".inal case, provides an analogous situation.
States Court of Appeals

~or

In that case the United

the 5th Circuit held that the time perioJ

in which an appeal o: a c ·~·.·ict:ic~ must be taken did not be;::in to r'm
until the defendant

·.·o.

··• .. ~ his right to appeal, <..•here thl.'

defendant had not been informed by the trial court that he had this
right.

The case here at issue involved a young, unsophisticated ·cirl,

acting under great stress, not represented hy counsel nor infor.,cd h·:
the court of her right to appeal at the conclusion of the: ilc<lrinc.

,11,

facts of this case certainly justify a re-application ,[ that r"li11
This is especially true '"hen Section 55-10-'JG,

u.c.A.

l'J~ l,

,l,

.lm.:,·lcccl,

and Rule 26 of the Juvenile Cou•:t Rules of Practice and Pruced,rc·

,h'\ l

ically direct the judge at the end of the l1earin·.· tc• 1nlun" ,, pan:.
unrepresented by counsel, of the right to appeal.

]L

ic,

Llhr·,iLL,,I

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

c~L

the petition to the Juvenile Court, requesting the setting aside of the
temination order, ._.,a, proper and timely whether thought of as either
in the nature of a prelude to an appeal or as a request to the Juvenile
Court for vacation of its January 9, 1975, order under its inherent
po,,·er

~ranted

by Section :i:i-10-106, for the very reason that the Juven-

ile Court failed to 1ulfill its statutory duty under Section 55-10-96.

P1llXT I\'

L... :_·lsrs .,r

I!![ ;nur::An,,:: SL\IL'IE, SECTIOK 55-10-109

u.c.A.

Sccti,>rc 55-l''-l''"'l· • L·.c.A. 1953, as amended, does not grant
to tl1c ]'1\"cnilc Court a ·...:::ene:ral authorization to terminate a parent's
parc:ttal :-Llot:, ~-L-.'lt_,

£~·

it!:

child ·..:lte.ne\·l:r t·:c .._~'urt suspects that a

Lhi 1,~ r-,i·.....:!lL ')L .::ul,,r._.:..__L: .:. ;)L ttLr lilt r,.:ith a ner,~· set of parents.
L;l..._

t""'-)'-·:cr

_rantL

t .. ,

c:1L L0trrt l::> a :::,ptcial,

Rather,

limited, dispositional
.':'

-1

1~r

-~

1.

Ct d

]_

l-.''

.[c>lL

..

.;:

vt,,]l

il

r1L

I ' '~ l

~ :ll': .J.n,l t~.,:,

l' 1 I I I

prcs211teJ to the court

In the Interest ,,f Pitts' 535 P.2d

1-tll- thL r, ScL L i . . 1n JS-10-109 con cains rather
._,,dr.l~

Jld!.l

1r0~ eviG~nce

lj'JJLLl:

·hich r.1ust be met to assure that the

',,3~ Jn urhlcr.stdnJing

,lf

the termination

[he advice of rtsht to

'i'•'" Cilte ""nl hy Sectic1n 55-lll-109(2). It is
ci
,II! l '. ;1i ,l, \
'l l
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asserted that when the record of a termination proceeding wholly fails
to reveal such advice having been given, that this constitutes reversible
error in and of itself.

Unless each and every applicable provision of

Section 55-10-109 is fully and completely satisfied, a disposition of
termination cannot be permitted to stand.

"Children are not realty and

rights pertaining to them must be handled with care and proper procedure."
State of Utah in the interest of Pitts, supra, at 1248.
Section 55-10-109 specifies only four circumstances under
which a Juvenile Court may properly terminate the parental relationship
and thereby overcome the very strong presumption in the law that a child
is better off with its natural mother, D___ P___ v.
19 Ut.2d 311, 431 P.2d 547 (Utah 1967).

~~·

i ·1

•;cr'.'ices,

Under Section 55-li,->,

the court may decree termination 1-1hen it finds "That the parent "r parents are unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child."
situations where a parent,

tr

This paragraph of the statute contemplate'
r''J;;h n1s or her o\m conduct cau'.c" L•)ndi-

tions seriously detr ir.·c

.1lJ.

Examples of the applicati ,,,

of this paragraph have included where the mother I·Jas mentally unstable
and essentially neglected her children altogether, In re State of utah,
In the Interest of Ronald Jennings and Donald Jenninc;s, 2 11 L.:L.2d '!",
432 P.2d 879 (Utah 1967); where a fathe1· killed his I·Jife in
children, In re State of Utah

In the Interest

"i

f:,•bin

1

r""'

'•i'

:l•tlli n at•·>

[J

Kelley Lee Hullin, 29 Ut.2d 376, 510 P.2J 531 (Utah l'JiJI; "!''-''' cl11·
mother of the children lacked che n~eressary ,::illo to sup<:rvi •.,,.

,lll•l

train her children, coupled with pour housckccpin·
low moral standards of the mother, State

of

Utah

in the: i

11

Lc rc' L
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532 P.2d 997 (Utah 1975); and in other instances where the acts of the
parents themselves are seriously detrimental to the welfare of the child,
In re State of Utah, in the interest of Inez Pilling et al v. Donna Lance,
23 Ut.2d 407, 464 P.2d 395 (Utah 1970).

The import of this paragraph of

the statute is aimed at situations or conditions which are directly
attributable to the actions or lack of actions on the part of the parents themselves.

This paragraph of the statute is not directed at the

situation of a sixteen (16) year old juvenile-mother, whose parents
refuse to allmc her to bring her child home.

It is not aimed at situa-

tions l>here, as the December 2, 197.13, petition for termination to the
Juvenile Court alleged, the juvenile mother "through no fault" of her
own was unable to temporarily care for her child.

It is not meant to

encor1pass situations ,,·here ::m otherwise fit and proper juvenile-mother
;.•as not permitted to bring her child home and no clear and convincing
~\·iJcnLe '-·.'as
::-itll~lti.)n

pr,___·sent€'d t~) the c,)urt that, given a little time, the f-h,r;~e

,•f Lllc t:JL'titi ,n._r ·:~,uld 11<..Jl have correcteJ itself, which was

indcccJ ·"·hat har~,n~·l in this particuLn case.
D~..-'pri·:~ltiL'n ot

This court has held:

th12 parents' custody of their children

ts a Jrastic rccmedv which should be resorted to only
1r1
L -,_rr'-·~·,c
~._·J>..._·:-. a.nJ h''hc.n it is manifest that the
lJ•'r·~ it~·o.:·l· cannl._1t l'r \,•ill not correct the evils
h'lll_~._:l l'>.. l ~L • •
Inez Pilling et al v. Donna Lance,

Stipr3,

at J97.

Scctic•n )~-l<l-lU''\li (b) and (c) contemplate two of the remaining three

L

i rcur.ts ranees h'hereby a Juvenile Court may terminate a parentlllcy encompass circumstances \\'here a parent has

L'l

Li 1 c:r JbJJJc:•'l1u'

,J

,,,d,! "r r"fus.:d to car" for the child after a trial
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and will not be discussed further.
c:il'Ctt'''~

The fourth, and last,

may assume the dispositional pm . ccr t(

t'--·n~'}

1

JLIVcnilc Cnurt

I1L·ro2in a

,;dt

3

,,n-cnt-child rclatidn-

,t·: :•c >·L-,1-nlj llZltL·d IIJ1tl!l
The parent-child rL·l~ti.,n~l-;
i1
tile Ltllll"t
voluntary petition u_;_ '''1'-- ,1r
'L'' 11_1}- I'!~
finds that such termin::ll:i•'~n i..::. in l:hc' :)L·~l interest of
the parent anL: the.. , 11; L,.
~)''-II l> ~-·- 1 ll ,, L 1, ·n \·.'i tl1
respect to one p~re:nt doc~ ll•ll ·Lfc(_·t tl1c ri_:hts ,,f

the other parent.
This portion of the
or parents come

<to~

volunt~~-

don't "tvant it (or can't
rights and find a

hnr.~

occurrence is prcse1··
ent perform an

j..::

1=, 1

_~_,1,-

c.;Xt...'

l •-

~

ll'

,::i1c

,)(._

"I

'I'"

p.1rl'nl,1l

iL1

iri 1

'-

I.:. II•_:

affic~at:

,-, L 1 t"'

(II t

'
1 '--,

'-

court disposition,

t ,.

I

c~

voluntar~l)

must make a

t

L

l ,l

,_,

t

t

t

]I-,

i

'1,).

l

the:

Ill..

I,

1

.-:cr,..~i

'(

•IIJ-l

Ll

'

"

--1!!

"IlL 11

,q-

r~

dispo~itic'Il

II,-·~

l '\

I

determinati··~,

it, that such a

ti'

'"

This is a two-s:c
and

r_-j

lc

I 1-

.I., ., ,-_
•
~·

,1

n.1 :_

'

<111.

l
l'-l

' '"

\ll

l

,,,

I ll

i·

l

and the child.
Also, Sccti

tl

disposition on the rart '

untarily appear bciore th
specifically dcnie;,

t(J

1-h,

parental rights of a par· ,,personally before til'" ,

Lcnrl-

1:11._

'Jill

J

1

1'/• , 1

11 /l

n

,,,(1

I

t d I

',,

L·-

r•

•11.

1 I

C,

1, ..

I

'I'

I

1•'1

~-,

; l

• 1.1

t

r•

J
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it is clear that the parental rights of a father, whose name the petitioner chose not to reveal, could not be terminated upon publication of
a notice of hearing in a newspaper.

The Juvenile Court cannot hang a

termination on both pegs; either the court terminates the relationship
for cause, or does so upon a voluntary petition.

It should not be per-

mitted to terminate the rights of a parent who appears personally and
voluntarily before the court on a voluntary petition, and at the same
hearing atterq1t to terminate, for cause, the parent-child relationship
of the non-appcdrlnc; parent in the same proceeding.

The processes are

separate and di,tinct, requiring different evidence on both points.

To

allm,· otherHise 1wuld permit an unintended circumvention of the statute
tO

OCLUre

Plllt\1 \'

filL: .\PPELL\::i ·..:.\S ::tlT IC.TOI\:lEfl tll' At\"D 1·.'.-\S THEREBY DENIED HER
(t>·~:s.:L.

FIL:JIT Ill

\ ih;,Jrirr,-

L•' c~._·rr indtc p..1rental ri:;hts in a child is d most

sericl,J:-. !'<J.ttcr an,· ::-IJ,lul~l ~'nl~: l'c LJnJcrt..lkcn in extreme cases.

thi.'-> type

L'l

ri·.~ht'-

~1

\)~

t!J(' d11ty

..1

"l ,t}L'

1..'/tt._•ll

•ll

lll,tfin.·

till'

,fl'll

i

qtiltL'

jll\'LJlllL•-'1\'l[i]..._l-

~__,1!-L

l!l•'

IJ!lpl·~ L"l\!t'lilL'I~

r~(L'Ilt,d

111

1:-

,lh'-,L'I1ll

ri·'ilt>

\•1

lih'

>j

::--L·~·i~.._,Lt::- l:hcn ...1n adult parent's rights are

cl~-L'

::_-,(1[J~i1t

t\ 1

>f\._Ll'"-':-it}

lll

t"\'L'[l

3

'-'l'lll'''-1

~l•]Lrll

t('>

\1r

Lh(_'

be_ ternlillatcd by the

COUrt,

J<.JllCihl r1·0pcr procedure rises tQ

~.,_,J;-;L_'S•

I\I\'CllilC-!1h1thcr

!

That

rhat this is especially true
.:lrC

::-LlUf';ht

tO

be terminated,

\tl\'Cnilc.-m..._lthcr, simply cannot be

l l1•

,"'~L''-'ti,\n SS-ltl-qb makes it abundantly clear that
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l~c•r,

the legislature acknowledged, and expressed o. concern

the rightc; c>t

juveniles to adequate representation by counsel in o.ll ',:eneral juvenile
court proceedings.
to the specific.

However, Section 55-lll-1119(21 transfers the general
In each and every tennination

nroccedin·~

the mandatory duty to inform the parties ,,[ thc'ir ri
also Rule 33, UJCRPP 1974).

,~ht

the C<'tirt has

(Sec

to counsel.

In this rarticular case, the record of the

January 9, 1975 termination hearim; 1.>hollv fails to disclose anv such
advice being given by the court.

The rec0rcl discloses that the Jtivcnilc

Court merely began the hearing hy

readin~

the petition that had been

filed with the court (Tr. 1, Jan•Jar" g, 1975).

r~c,,rrl

Theo

discloses

that only the juvenile-mother, a 'is >!arilyn llalc of LJFS, and ~Is ~!arc o.rc·t
Peterson of the court prol.Jation olficc. .:1ppearcd ~)1.._·fl1r(· ti~c cn11rt on Jan-

uary 9, 1975.

(Findings ,:: 'act anJ Deocrcc, Jan11ar; ~. 1'17')

record discloses that Hhcn '!..._

'-Iril'"·- li.J.lL'

~lf'S r.~a(1c

(l[

Thee

1.

r','lLrL·nl-c

t..._,

representation by counsel ac
question the juvenilc-9, 1975 hearing (Tr. 2, JJ.t,
show that notice of the Janc1ary Y, l 'Jr, hcar in

i

\',:n

t,,

an':(lJ1L

other than the juvenile-mother.
In the memorandum decisi

ln

1

L L:l1c.:

CCHlrt,

April 22, 1976 hearing, the cottrt in(~iLau_,
Decision, Hay 4, 1976) that thr· (_our-t''

r(·

1 ;J.·1rn r,lph
(1lll,_L),)q

the mother had been advised of her r1;~1lt tu 1 nt~n·.t·l
of the recorder.
grounds.

l'o'":lr..:'~

It ic, submittcod ti,'"t titer<

J,

'.J

aJ tcr

tltc

'1LIIlnrandun'
rl·I_l_l

her!

t:\1<Jt

pri~n- tc1 ,Htival il1n

i,

First, the rc:cord uhir h

logical reading of thee tran:,cri

rt

iJl

lit('

ldi"t:tr"

')j)

li(•,"\1-Jil,'
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]_.~-

convey the impr.ession that ouch adviLe was given or that the recorder
was inadvertently turne:•' on late:, J.fter the hearing had cormnenced.
~>!hen

Secondly,

1976 hearing,

discussion took place upon this issue at the April 22,
the Court requested evidence from Mr. Jones of the prose-

cuting attorney's office (Tr. 11, April 22, 1976) as to whether or not
he recalled a .liscu•sion prior to turning on the recorder.

During this

time the Jt!Venilc-.-hlthcr '.-:as sh,1kin·r.!, her head in disagreement to the

content of the court'• discussion (Tr. 12, April 22, 1976) yet the court
~r.Jm

refused t•• all.••..: tc,ticwn-;

the

juvenile-rcother herself as to whether

nr not she ,,·as advi•e.! ,•f her right to cc•unsel (Tr. 14, April 22, 1976).
It is J.ssertl',; that t'•i• ·:as an abuse ,,f the discretionary power of the
SinLL evidence ·.a--. hcarJ lrt:'I!T. the County .\tt ·:11ev,

L11urt.

nothcr :.lh)ulJ pr1_1pcrly lla·:~_

'.-:cnt

hcen all'-·)\~·eJ to testily u1 rebuttal, as this

3 . . . . aterL1l allc..:ati,__-ln ,,: crr,)r on the part of the court at the

tc1

:·\1._,,\~

it" ncr'~..lran._~'l:-"

in

~c~_ision,

..!raph "•, >~c:l•'ran-_!·c·" ·~c.._ i::-i.-,n, ''ay --..,

>!

l1c

IC 01-

I1L

1

in __ .

I 11

.ll

r

r

11. ".. c

l'

Ill'

t'll'

'ill"'.

\'•- 1·,

,j]'["J,

1

c
[

il"

'),__·•

1"•

1[1'1,

the juvenile-

I

t•'

I

,!:],_

l

'I

111

the L<.JUrt inJi . .:ated ~Para-

l97L' 1 that even 1i there indeed \~'as

.lpjlc~rcJ
!"o.-'l'llr·!1o2rL·J

wit\1 coun~el at the prior

thJt the January 9, 1975 hear-

1::. '

!

t
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a juvenile need only be apprised of his right to counsel the first time
the child ever appears in the juvenile court, and not thereafter.
vice of right to counsel

Ad-

iG not a blanket statement given once and then

waived for each new matter.

Each and every time a child appears before

the court on a new petition, the advice of right to counsel must be
given anew.

POINT VI
THE APPELLANT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY TERHINATE HER PARENTAL RIGHTS
Section 55-10-109(5) sets out the requirements for a voluntary
termination of the parent-child relationship.

However, this appellant

did not appear voluntarily before the Juvenile Court.
summoned on a petition filed with the court by DFS.
decision (Paragraph 7, Hemorandum Decision,

~lay

Rather, she 1vas
In its memorandum

4, 1976) the court

stated that this error 'vas ct:solved

~Jhen

the termination in cc1rt

9, 1975 thereby ratifying the peti-

Ja:"~~HY

tion filed by DFS.

-.,

-1 ~

,1a~

the juvenile-mother agreed to

t\JO errors.

First, no matter ho\..'

the court tries to bend the facts to fit the statute, the mother 11as, in
fact, not voluntarily before the court.

The court has chosen to regard

the termination as a voluntary relinquishment (Paragraphs 5, 7, >lemorandum Decision, Hay 4, 1976).

That being the case it \·JOulrJ have been

necessary for the natural mothec to vul•mtarily submit the petition
the court rather than DFS.

L"

The mere fact that she appeared on January

9, 1975 indicates nothing more than that th<e juvenile-mother 1vas aw;v!l ring the SUliU!lons.

That contains not evcen a hint of voluntariness.

It

is submitted that the lack of a voluntary petition, standing alone,

1'

sufficient statutory error to require revcersal of the court order l.'hl'n
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~I.e

tcmination is characterized as a voluntary relinquishment.

Further,

that the sununons to the temination lt"aring made it not a voluntary relinquishment but rather an adversary proceeding in which the child could
only have been removed from the mother for cause.

(Tr. 10,20, April 22,

The Juvenile Court made much of the fact that the juvenile-

1976).

mother "offerrcJ no defense or resistance hereto, legally or actually."
(Para,:raplt I, :·enora:oJum Decision, 'lay 4, 1976).

However, a careful

rcaJin,- of ti1c tran,,ript of the January 9, 1975 hearing indicates that
the: r:lL>thcr ..._uulC
<1oulc~

nor

~1J·11tl~._i

- i:<lt....:Lll

(

i

talL,

L\·en

L:1araLtLr1zeJ a

that iL

1

.arl:ly

let alone prepare or present a defense,

, :1e: :1a\·c hccn rcas.)nably expected to have done so.

pro"--c._c.,:in

'Lilt

1

lr

l..._~,

..1~

J

\'''lunlaty relinquishment.
:-~at teL-

u[

It is submitted

that a juvenile-mother, here

la\-.',

·;LJ.r >

:lly

:.,11,'

'lL:·

Li•Lll

bL ],L

a

Indeed

Ll1L

j,,_·~._r•i l~~-:·

'11cn cltL

re:L~._,rd
t~.•

l''L . . :Lll):__'--

,..,f the c.J.se conclusively

:~Lc 1 ~

l1cr ..._hilJ.

(Tr. 2, 3,

J..lilll..lJ-:_

·L

\' •] 'I•

r

,J

i'll

,r

.,

L

·h L

c

i i]

!'

1 "

'
dll

l

,

<'I

~l

~._h,'::-L·n

LiiL

~rr.

··-..1··

.,

',',

.tl r

.\pril 22,

l'-~7t· 1

1976, and Para-

1·.::1thcr than a termination

l ftL 11

,L[

Li, 1

1\,__;,ilL-rl<'L'llr LhL)~L' not

11 :_

t,_, L-haLJ.ctcrize the pro-

1

:1

tu

reveal.

Characterized

l
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POINT VII
THE EVIDENCE WAS \ffiOLLY INS UFFICIEI'rT TO PERHIT A TERI'liNATION

FOR CAUSE.
While characterizing the termination as " volunt<lry relinquishment, the Juvenile Court has tried to allaH itself an out by also implying that sufficient cause existed for termination irregardless of the
alleged voluntary nature of the termination (Paragr<lph 10,
Decision, May 4, 1976).

~!emorandum

The finding that the juvenile-mother Has unable

to adequately provide for her child '"as based solely upon the statement
of the

appellant that she could not keep her child because her parents

refused to alloH her to bring the child home.

Termination '..Jas ordered,

in spite of the fact that the court had previously entered the

~ovember

6, 1974 order placing the child with DFS for one year, 1iliich wCls in itself an adequate tempcrar:,· solution to the problem,

This juvenile-

mother Has una:Ole :r c,cc-o- -=.r:'-1-: care for her chilLI only in that she '..'Cls
impecunious in her oHn

rl,~itt,

1;as dependent upon her parents for support,

and her parents had refuseJ to provide any financial support for the
child,

The December 2, l97l! pcti tiun,

filed l!itl> the court by DFS,

represented the exact situation contemplated hy Chief Justice !!enri<>d
in his dissent in State of Utah

in the: interc:st of T,G,, Sl2 P.2d '!''7,

at 999 (Utah 1975), where an impecunious mother, uho uCls in Litis case·
impecunious "through no fault of her own" (December 2, l'J75, petition
to Juvenile Court) 1-1as denied the ri;~ht nf companionship

,,j tit

Iter cit i I

after the Juvenile Court had alreaJy ceLttercd an ord'-'r placinc; the
in the temporary custody of llFS for one year drtrin" l!ltich tl1c ],,,m,c
ation of the appellant \-JOuld have had a chance to corrc•ct it·-cll.

clti !d
-tL",,\)
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other reasons or evidence for termination were presented to the court,
nor was testimony heard from any other party that the mother was in any
way unfit or incompetent in a manner contemplated by statute, which was
of her own doing.

It is submitted that the evidence presented was

wholly insufficient, as a matter of law, to deny custody of the child
to its natural

~other

for cause.

It is also submitted that both the

evidence relating to voluntary relinquishment, and the evidence relating
to the alleged tcrnination for cause, both fail to meet even the standard set out "Y
of Utah

LiHc

cu<Jrt in regard to voluntary termination in State

in the interc:st of Pitts, 535 P.2d 1244, at 1248 (Utah 1975)

wherein the court said:
'-l~._l.:J€

i·.'e bcli(:VL' :,uch language comes

to .._our thinking

t<' the "fic:ct that a child should not be taken from
its parents save by clear and convincing evidence of
intention to give up parental rights -- something
al"'ost akin to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
There \·:as no sho.,.:in.:_

·.:llat~\·L.'r

than to rcr~ove the ell iLl

Cr·•r:

that the

c~.,urt

its r.1other.

haC n..:1 alternative

~=·tner

:\or \-:as there any shov.ring

that the soll: inc•-lr:lpctcncy ~'t the juvcnile-muther \\'as other than one

imp0secl upc•n her bv \·irtuc
,,f the court '1carinc.
upon a ju\·cnilc

1

....;

o:

her temporary status in life at the time

.\ termination bY the Juvenile Court based solely

tc!:por.J.~: statu:--

~'r

~ration in

life is not only an in-

justice to b···th ~arcnt and child buL i,; simplY offensive, not only to

Hherein it says·

lt i"- l-l1c purpll~c ·•i this act to secure for each
'-hil~. l,_l)r.nn; hciore the juvenile CL'~urt such care,
L·.ui.JanlL', and l'l)ntL·c"l, preferably in his o\m home,
a::- \.'lll ~cr\'L ;li::. \·:t.:lfare anJ the best interests
•1 t 1 <c
Lcil<': t,• preserve anJ strengthen family
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ties whenever possible; to secure for any child
who is removed from his home the care, guidance, and
discipline required to assist him to develop into a
responsible citizen, to improve the conditions and
home environment responsible for his delinquency;
and, at the same time, to protect the community and
its individual citizens against juvenile violence
and juvenile laH breaking. To this end this act
shall be liberally construed. Section 55-10-63

POINT VIII
THE APPELlANT ONLY AGREED TO TER1'1INATION OF HER PARENTAL
RIGHTS BECAUSE OF COERCION.

The adamant refusal on the part of the juvenile-mother's parents at the time the appellant agreed to the termination of her parental
rights on January 9, 1975 constituted a subtle, yet very strong clement
of coercion on the juvenile-mother's conduct.

The appellant made a

mistake by becoming prec;nant, and such an occurrence of um;cd motherhood
had never occurred

i~-

"cr 'anc-'-ly before.

emotionally and

As a result, the parents acted

, 1t in placing the sole decision-makin:·

burden on a young girl 1-1ho in the midst of a hi~hly traumatic experience
could be subject to over-persuasion on the part of DI"S social 1-JOrkers
and indeed the court itself.

At the hearing the court failed to thor-

oughly examine the background and competing pressures and influences on
the j•Jvenile-mother.

Rather, the Juvenile Court merely tooL the otanccc

that an unrepresented, unadvised sixteen (16) Y'-'ar •Jld ~irl could make
any and all decisions in an immediate, y~t rational fasldo:1.

It is

u 1 J-

mitted that this is simply too great a burden tn expect" JIIVenilccmother, vulnerable to undue influence, to "'ake on her m-m.

AL

t·f1,_·

least, the court should have postponed the hcarin·.· until tl1c '-''"'n

-,-r-:

cirl

would
have
been
able
to appear
indigitization
court provided
'.d tl1 byathe1110rr·
ralanda1l'.ri
tl1 :trl
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a DFS worker who had consistently recormnended termination.

A simple

analysis of the record indicates that the juvenile-mother was agreeable
only because she felt she had no choice (Tr. 3, January 9, 1975).

This

is not a voluntary relin<]uishment, but per se coercion.

CONCLUSION
\~1en

one looks at the overall picture and views the extent and

magnitude of the deviance from statutory requirements, the denial of due
process to the petiti<Jner is overwhelming.

A child was taken from its

natural CJother because she ;:as temporarily unable to care for her child
because ,,f her temporary status of being a ju\·eni l.e.

The Juvenile Court

acted in has tc and l·:i thout due regard, indeed no regard for statutory
requirements; and, ao ,uch, its actions must not be permitted to stand.
The statute has a purpose, it has goals and requirements, and these
standards CJust he met.
cir~..umvcnt

these . . tanJarJs thro....lu::;h inattention to statutory requirements
thrc1u:~h

or oimplv

The Juvenile Court shoulJ r.ot be allowed to

lack ,,f ,liligence.

A termination proceeding is far

too "criuus to bL handled \·:ith haste.

1lnc lCJs t pcJint

>.·

hicl1 has been raised is the fact that the

child has alr"ad\· been adc•rtuJ.
~rief ',:ill

'olved.

This is truly unfortunate, extreme

undouhtc,Jly ,),_;(._ur no nattcr hoh' the question is finally re-

lloh·evcr,

pctitiuner herein.

J<Istice has not been done to the juvenile-mother, the
She ,.:as the victin or a casual and unlawful taking

of her child, , l<>thccl in a mere semblance of legal requirements.

She

c:a·. nut alfonlcd tl1c henefi ts and protections accruing to her as a matl)f
L~i~·ht und(.._.r Llll Lermination statute.
And, in certain
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circumstances, even the old adage, that the \velfare of the child is all
controlling, must yield to the requirements of due process under the

la~;

and equal justice in the courts as afforded hy statute.
Appellant respectfully asks the Court to rule that the Juvenile Court lacked the dispositional p01ver under the particular circumstances of this case to terminate the parental rights of the Appellant;
that the evidence failed to support a termination for cause; that the
relinquishment Has not voluntary, therefore, that the order of the
Juvenile Court should be vacated and set aside.

Respectfully submitted,

JA.'!ES R. HASENYAGER
~ttorney

for Appellant
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